drafting "Reply to The Unit"

diff --git a/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md b/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md
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--- a/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md
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@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 Title: Reply to <em>The Unit of Caring</em> on Adult Human Females
-Date: 2018-03-26 18:00
+Date: 2018-03-28 18:00
 Category: commentary
 Tags: epistemology, sex differences, The Unit of Caring
+Status: draft
 
 The author of the (highly recommended!) Tumblr blog [_The Unit of Caring_](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com) [responds to](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com/post/171986501376/your-post-on-definition-of-gender-and-woman-and) an anonymous correspondent's observation that trans-exclusionary radical feminists tend to define the word _woman_ as "adult human biological female":
 
@@ -13,6 +14,40 @@ I would say that a notable good property of the "adult human female" definition
 
 In contrast, a strict gender-identity-based definition doesn't have this useful non-circularity property. If all I know about _women_ is that women are defined as people who identify as women, I can't _use_ that definition to figure out which people are women and what probabilistic predictions I should make about them. This point may be more apparent if you substitute some completely foreign concept for _women_. If someone told you that zorplebobben are people who identify as zorplebobben, you would probably have questions about what that means! _Why_ do they identify as zorplebobben? _Given_ that someone is a zorplebobben, what _else_ should I infer about them? The self-identity criterion doesn't help: without a base case, the infinite recursion of (people who identify as (people who identify as (people who identify as ...))) never terminates.
 
-Of course, people who believe in the primacy of gender identity over biological sex aren't _trying_ to engage in circular reasoning. If they _are_ making a philosophical mistake, there has to be some explanation of what makes the mistake appealing enough for so many people to make it. But it's not hard to guess: there are, empirically, a small-but-not-vanishingly-small minority of people with a penis, XY chromosomes, facial hair, _&c._ who _wish_ that they had a vagina, XX chromosomes, breasts, _&c._, and in a enlightened techological civilization, it seems humane to accomodate this desire as much as feasible, by giving people access to hormones and surgeries that approximate the phenotype of the other sex, respecting their chosen pronouns, _&c._ Thus we can legitimately end up with a _non_-circular trans-inclusive definition of _women_: "adult human females, and also adult human males who have undergone interventions to resemble adult human females sufficiently closely so that they can be taken as such in social situations." But this is a mere broadening of the "adult human female" definition that tacks on extra complexity for humanitarian reasons; the core idea is still intact.
+Of course, people who believe in the primacy of gender identity aren't _trying_ to engage in circular reasoning. If they _are_ making a philosophical mistake, there has to be some explanation of what makes the mistake appealing enough for so many people to make it. But it's not hard to guess: there are, empirically, a small-but-not-vanishingly-small minority of people with a penis, XY chromosomes, facial hair, _&c._ who _wish_ that they had a vagina, XX chromosomes, breasts, _&c._, and in a enlightened techological civilization, it seems humane to accomodate this desire as much as feasible, by giving people access to hormones and surgeries that approximate the phenotype of the other sex, respecting their chosen pronouns, _&c._ Thus we can legitimately end up with a _non_-circular trans-inclusive definition of _women_: "adult human females, and also adult human males who have undergone interventions to resemble adult human females sufficiently closely so that they can be taken as such socially." But this is a mere broadening of the "adult human female" definition that tacks on extra complexity (partially for humanitarian reasons and partially to better predict social phenomena that most people care more about than biological minutiae). The core idea is still intact.
 
-One could argue that 
\ No newline at end of file
+One might counterargue that this is unjustifiably assuming "biologically female" as a primitive. The author seems to endorse a critique along these lines as the first of three objections to the "adult human female" criterion of womanhood—
+
+> 1) The way we draw categories in biology is a social decision we make for social and cultural reasons, it isn’t a feature of the biology itself. A different sort of society might categorize infertile humans as a separate gender, for example, and that'd be as justified by the biology as our system. Or have 'prepubescent' be a gender, or 'having living offspring' be a gender—there are a million things that these categories could just as reasonably, from the biology, have been drawn around.
+
+I've addressed this class of argument at length (about 7500 words) in a previous post, ["The Categories Were Made for Man to Make Predictions"](http://unremediatedgender.space/2018/Feb/the-categories-were-made-for-man-to-make-predictions/), but to summarize _briefly_, while I _agree_ that categories can be defined in many ways to suit different cultural priorities, not all possible categories are equally useful, because the cognitive function of categories is to group similar things together so that we can make similar predictions about them.
+
+A free-thinking biologist certainly _could_ choose to reject the othrodoxy of grouping living things by ancestry and reproductive isolation and instead choose to study living things that are yellow, but her treatises would probably be difficult to follow, because "living things that are yellow" is instrinsically a much less cohesive subject matter than, say, "birds": experience with black crows is probably going to be _more_ useful when studying yellow canaries than experience with yellow daffodills—even if, in all philosophical strictness, there are a million things that these categories could have been drawn around, and who can say but that some other culture's biologists might have chosen color rather than ancestry as the true determinant of "species"?
+
+It is of course true that different cultures will place different emphases and interpretations on various ways in which people can differ: being prepubescent or a parent might have special significance in some cultures that outsiders could never understand. But to say that prepubescents might as well be a "gender"—well, at this point I must confess that I'm really not sure what this "gender" thing is the author is trying to talk about.
+
+And I guess that's the problem. People who favor the "adult human female" definition of _women_ aren't trying to invalidate anyone's "gender"; they're trying to talk about _biological sex_ using simple, universally-understood words. Biological sex is obviously not the only category in the world—in a lot of situations, you might care more about whether someone has living children—or for that matter, whether an organism is yellow—than what sex it is.
+
+But when people _do_ want to talk about sex—when they want to carve reality along that _particular_ joint, without denying that there are [superexponentially](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/82eMd5KLiJ5Z6rTrr/superexponential-conceptspace-and-simple-words) many others in the vastness of configuration space—there's something _profoundly frustrating_ about Blue Tribe culture's unshakeable insistence that certain inferences _must not_ be made, that certain conceptual distinctions must not be _expressible_, except perhaps cloaked behind polysyllabic obfuscations like "assigned sex at birth" (as if the doctors made a _mistake_!).
+
+Consider these fictional (but, I fear, all too realistic) dialogues—
+
+[TODO: some sort of medical/reproduction dialogue here]
+
+**Alice**: I think it was _terribly_ unfair how that state high school track championship was won by a male-to-female transgender person who wasn't even on hormone replacement therapy!  
+**Bob**: I don't see the problem. It's a girl's track meet. Trans girls _are_ girls, _by definition_. On what grounds could anyone possibly object?  
+**Alice**: ...  
+
+**Alice**: I'm sad that the sex ratio of my local decision-theory and compiler-development unified meetup group is so lopsided!  
+**Bob**: What do you mean? There were lots of women at that meetup!  
+**Alice**: Yeah, but literally all of us were trans.  
+**Bob**: So?  
+**Alice**: ...  
+
+**Alice**: Have you seen this [the Sweedish cohort study in which MtF violent crime rate was similar to that of men]  
+**Bob**: [O terrible discrimination]  
+**Alice**: Can you think of any _other_ possible interpretations of the data?  
+**Bob**: No.  
+**Alice**: Like, what do you make of the observation that the trans women's violent crime rate was not just higher than cis women's, but also strikingly close to that of cis _men_? Can you think of any reason—any reason at all—why that _might not be a coincidence_?  
+**Bob**: No, that has to be a coincidence. What could trans women and cis men possibly have in common?  
+**Alice**: ...