Maybe with more time and more effort I could find _exactly_ the right words to cover every possible caveat and nitpick and _finally_ be able to communicate the thing—
-But maybe I just need to relax. Not take it so seriously. Forget about the topic for a few days or a few months. Wash the goddamned dishes, write some goddamned code. _Maybe_ it's not [the end of the world](http://unremediatedgender.space/2017/Jan/from-what-ive-tasted-of-desire/) if someone is Wrong on the Internet.
+But maybe I just need to relax. Not take it so seriously. Forget about the topic for a few days or a few months. Wash the goddamned dishes, write some goddamned code. _Maybe_ it's not [the end of the world](/2017/Jan/from-what-ive-tasted-of-desire/) if someone is Wrong on the Internet.
But it's only "obvious" if you take as a given that Yudkowsky is playing a savvy Kolmogorov complicity strategy like any other public intellectual in the current year.
-Maybe this seems banal if you haven't spent your entire adult life in his robot cult. From anyone else in the world, I wouldn't have had a problem with the "hill of validity in defense of meaning" thread—I would have respected it as a solidly above-average philosophy performance before [setting the bozo bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bozo_bit#Dismissing_a_person_as_not_worth_listening_to) on the author and getting on with my day. But since I _did_ spend my entire adult life in Yudkowsky's robot cult, trusting him the way a Catholic trusts the Pope, I _had_ to assume that it was an "honest mistake" in his rationality lessons, and that honest mistakes could be honestly corrected if someone put in the effort to explain the problem. The idea that Eliezer Yudkowsky was going to behave just as badly as any other public intellectual in the current year was not really in my hypothesis space.
+Maybe this seems banal if you haven't spent your entire adult life in his robot cult. From anyone else in the world, I wouldn't have had a problem with the "hill of meaning in defense of validity" thread—I would have respected it as a solidly above-average philosophy performance before [setting the bozo bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bozo_bit#Dismissing_a_person_as_not_worth_listening_to) on the author and getting on with my day. But since I _did_ spend my entire adult life in Yudkowsky's robot cult, trusting him the way a Catholic trusts the Pope, I _had_ to assume that it was an "honest mistake" in his rationality lessons, and that honest mistakes could be honestly corrected if someone put in the effort to explain the problem. The idea that Eliezer Yudkowsky was going to behave just as badly as any other public intellectual in the current year was not really in my hypothesis space.
Ben shared the account of our posse's email campaign with someone who commented that I had "sacrificed all hope of success in favor of maintaining his own sanity by CC'ing you guys." That is, if I had been brave enough to confront Yudkowsky by myself, maybe there was some hope of him seeing that the game he was playing was wrong. But because I was so cowardly as to need social proof (because I believed that an ordinary programmer such as me was as a mere worm in the presence of the great Eliezer Yudkowsky), it probably just looked to him like an illegible social plot originating from Michael.
>
> —_Atlas Shrugged_ by Ayn Rand
-Recapping my Whole Dumb Story so far—in a previous post, ["Sexual Dimorphism in Yudkowsky's Sequences, in Relation to My Gender Problems"](/2021/May/sexual-dimorphism-in-the-sequences-in-relation-to-my-gender-problems/), I explained the thing about how I've always (since puberty) had this obsessive sexual fantasy about being magically transformed into a woman
+Quickly recapping my Whole Dumb Story so far: [ever since puberty, I've had this obsessive sexual fantasy about being magically transformed into a woman, which got contextualized by these life-changing Sequences of blog posts by Eliezer Yudkowsky which taught me (amongst many, many other things) how fundamentally disconnected from reality my fantasy was.](/2021/May/sexual-dimorphism-in-the-sequences-in-relation-to-my-gender-problems/) [So it came as a huge surprise when, around 2016, the community that had formed around the Sequences (including Eliezer Yudkowsky) seemingly unanimously decided that guys like me might actually be women in some unspecified metaphysical sense.](/2023/Jul/blanchards-dangerous-idea-and-the-plight-of-the-lucid-crossdreamer/) A couple years later, after having put some effort into arguing against the popular misconception that the matter could be resolved by simply redefining the word _woman_, Yudkowsky prevaricated
-and used
-In a subsequent post, ["Blanchard's Dangerous Idea and the Plight of the Lucid Crossdreamer"](/2023/Jul/blanchards-dangerous-idea-and-the-plight-of-the-lucid-crossdreamer/),
-In a subsequent–subsequent post, ["A Hill of Validity in Defense of Meaning"](/2023/Jul/a-hill-of-validity-in-defense-of-meaning/),
+prompting me to join up with allies to
+
+
+
+(/2023/Jul/a-hill-of-validity-in-defense-of-meaning/)
+
+
+Really, that should have been the end of the story.
-In a subsequent–subsequent–subsequent post, "If Clarity Seems Like Death to Them",
-]
On 13 February 2021, ["Silicon Valley's Safe Space"](https://archive.ph/zW6oX), the _New York Times_ piece on _Slate Star Codex_ came out. It was ... pretty lame? (_Just_ lame, not a masterfully vicious hit piece.) Cade Metz did a mediocre job of explaining what our robot cult is about, while [pushing hard on the subtext](https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=5310) to make us look racist and sexist, occasionally resorting to odd constructions that were surprising to read from someone who had been a professional writer for decades. ("It was nominally a blog", Metz wrote of _Slate Star Codex_. ["Nominally"](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/nominally)?) The article's claim that Alexander "wrote in a wordy, often roundabout way that left many wondering what he really believed" seemed to me more like a critique of the "many"'s reading comprehension, rather than Alexander's writing.
So the _New York Times_ implicitly accuses us of being racists, like Charles Murray, and instead of pointing out that being a racist _like Charles Murray_ is the obviously correct position that sensible people will tend to reach in the course of being sensible, we disingenuously deny everything.[^deny-everything]
-[^deny-everything]: Or rather, people are distributed on a spectrum between disingenuously denying everything and sincerly accepting that Charles Murray is Actually Bad, with the older and more skilled among us skewed somewhat more towards disingenuous denial.
+[^deny-everything]: Or rather, people are distributed on a spectrum between disingenuously denying everything and sincerely accepting that Charles Murray is Actually Bad, with the older and more skilled among us skewed somewhat more towards disingenuous denial.
-It works surprisingly well. I fear my love of Truth is not so great that if I didn't have Something to Protect, I would have happily participated in the cover-up.
+It works surprisingly well. I fear my love of Truth is not so great that if I didn't have Something to Protect, I would have happily participated in the coverup.
-As it happens, in our world, the defensive cover-up consists of _throwing me under the bus_. Facing censure from the progressive egregore for being insufficiently progressive, we can't defend ourselves ideologically. (_We_ think we're egalitarians, but progressives won't buy that because we like markets too much.) We can't point to our racial diversity. (Mostly white if not Jewish, with a handful of East and South Asians, exactly as you'd expect from chapters 13 and 14 of _The Bell Curve_.) [Subjectively](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Availability_heuristic), I felt like the sex balance got a little better after we hybridized with Tumblr and Effective Alruism (as [contrasted with the old days](/2017/Dec/a-common-misunderstanding-or-the-spirit-of-the-staircase-24-january-2009/)), but survey data doesn't unambiguously back this up.[^survey-data]
+As it happens, in our world, the defensive coverup consists of _throwing me under the bus_. Facing censure from the progressive egregore for being insufficiently progressive, we can't defend ourselves ideologically. (_We_ think we're egalitarians, but progressives won't buy that because we like markets too much.) We can't point to our racial diversity. (Mostly white if not Jewish, with a handful of East and South Asians, exactly as you'd expect from chapters 13 and 14 of _The Bell Curve_.) [Subjectively](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Availability_heuristic), I felt like the sex balance got a little better after we hybridized with Tumblr and Effective Alruism (as [contrasted with the old days](/2017/Dec/a-common-misunderstanding-or-the-spirit-of-the-staircase-24-january-2009/)), but survey data doesn't unambiguously back this up.[^survey-data]
[^survey-data]: We go from 89.2% male in the [2011 _Less Wrong_ survey](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HAEPbGaMygJq8L59k/2011-survey-results) to a virtually unchanged 88.7% male on the [2020 _Slate Star Codex_ survey](https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/01/20/ssc-survey-results-2020/)—although the [2020 EA survey](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) says only 71% male, so it depends on how you draw the category boundaries of "we."
A common misconception about words is that they have definitions: look up the definition, and that tells you everything to know about that word ... right?
-It can't _actually_ work that way—not in principle. The problem—one of them, anyway—is that with a sufficiently active imagination, you can imagine edge cases that satisfy the definition, but aren't what you _really mean_ by the word.
+It can't actually work that way—not in principle. The problem—one of them, anyway—is that with a sufficiently active imagination, you can imagine edge cases that satisfy the definition, but aren't what you really mean by the word.
What's a _woman_? An adult human female. (Let's [not play dumb about this](/2018/Apr/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females/) today.) Okay, but then what does _female_ mean? One common and perfectly serviceable definition: of the sex that produces larger gametes—ova, eggs.
But if you saw this person on the street or even slept in their bed, you wouldn't want to call them a woman, because everything about them that you can observe looks like that of an adult human male. If you're not a reproductive health lab tech and don't look at the photographs in biology textbooks, you'll never _see_ the gametes someone's body produces. (You can see semen, but the individual spermatozoa are too small to look at without a microscope; people [didn't even know that ova and sperm _existed_ until the 17th century](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1439-0531.2012.02105.x).) Does that mean this common definition of _female_ isn't perfectly serviceable after all?
-No, because humans whose gonads produce eggs but appear male in every other aspect, are something I just made up out of thin air for the purposes of this blog post; they don't exist in the real world. What this really shows is that the cognitive technology of "words" having "definitions" doesn't work in _the world of the imagination_, because _the world of the imagination_ encompasses (at a minimum) _all possible configurations of matter_. Words are [short messages that compress information about the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mB95aqTSJLNR9YyjH/message-length), but what it _means_ for the world to contain compressible information is that some things in the world are more probable than others.
+No, because humans whose gonads produce eggs but appear male in every other aspect, are something I just made up out of thin air for the purposes of this blog post; they don't exist in the real world. What this really shows is that the cognitive technology of "words" having "definitions" doesn't work in the world of the imagination, because _the world of the imagination_ encompasses (at a minimum) _all possible configurations of matter_. Words are [short messages that compress information about the world](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mB95aqTSJLNR9YyjH/message-length), but what it means for the world to contain compressible information is that some things in the world are more probable than others.
To see why, let's take a brief math detour and review some elementary information theory. Instead of the messy real world, take a restricted setting: the world of strings of 20 bits. Suppose you wanted to devise an efficient _code_ to represent elements of this world with _shorter_ strings, such that you could say (for example) `01100` (in the efficient code, using just 5 bits) and the people listening to you would know that what you actually saw in the world was (for example) `01100001110110000010`.
-If every length-20 bitstring in the world has equal probability, this can't be done: there are 2<sup>20</sup> (= 1,048,576) length-20 strings and only 2<sup>5</sup> (= 32) length-5 codewords; there aren't enough codewords to go around to cover all the strings in this world. It's worse than that: if every length-20 bitstring in the world has equal probability, you can't have labels that compress information _at all_: if you said that the first 19 bits of something you saw in the world were `0110000111011000001`, the people listening to you would be completely clueless as to whether the whole thing was `0110000111011000001`**`0`** or `0110000111011000001`**`1`**. Just _locating_ a book in the [Jose Luis Borges's Library of Babel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Library_of_Babel) is mathematically equivalent to writing it yourself.
+If every length-20 bitstring in the world has equal probability, this can't be done: there are 2<sup>20</sup> (= 1,048,576) length-20 strings and only 2<sup>5</sup> (= 32) length-5 codewords; there aren't enough codewords to go around to cover all the strings in this world. It's worse than that: if every length-20 bitstring in the world has equal probability, you can't have labels that compress information at all: if you said that the first 19 bits of something you saw in the world were `0110000111011000001`, the people listening to you would be completely clueless as to whether the whole thing was `0110000111011000001`**`0`** or `0110000111011000001`**`1`**. Just _locating_ a book in the [Jose Luis Borges's Library of Babel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Library_of_Babel) is mathematically equivalent to writing it yourself.
-However, in the world of a _non-uniform probability distribution_ over strings of 20 bits, compression—and therefore language—_is_ possible . If almost all the bitstrings you actually saw in the world were either all-zeros (`00000000000000000000`) or all-ones (`11111111111111111111`), with a very few exceptions that were still _mostly_ one bit or the other (like `00010001000000000000` or `11101111111011011111`), then you could devise a very efficient encoding.
+However, in the world of a _non-uniform probability distribution_ over strings of 20 bits, compression—and therefore language—_is_ possible. Say, if almost all the bitstrings you actually saw in the world were either all-zeros (`00000000000000000000`) or all-ones (`11111111111111111111`), with a very few exceptions that were still _mostly_ one bit or the other (like `00010001000000000000` or `11101111111011011111`), then you could devise an efficient encoding.
To _be_ efficient, you'd want to reserve the shortest words for the most common cases: like `00` in the code to mean `00000000000000000000` in the world and `01` to mean `11111111111111111111`. Then you could have slightly-longer words that encode all the various exceptions, like maybe the merely-eleven-bit encoding `10110101110` could represent `00100010000000000000` in the world (`1` to indicate that this is one of the exceptions, a following `0` to indicate that _most_ of the bits are `0`, followed by the [Elias self-delimiting integer codes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elias_omega_coding) for 3 (`110`) and 7 (`101110`) to indicate that the 3rd and 7th bits are actually `1`).
Then if you wanted an efficient encoding to talk about the two and only two _clusters_ of bitstrings—the mostly-zeros (a majority of `00000000000000000000` plus a few exceptions with a few bits flipped) and the mostly-ones (a majority of `11111111111111111111` plus a few exceptions with a few bits flipped)—you might want to use the first bit as the "definition" for your codewords—even if most of the various [probabilistic inferences that you wanted to make](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/3nxs2WYDGzJbzcLMp/words-as-hidden-inferences) [on the basis of cluster-membership](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gDWvLicHhcMfGmwaK/conditional-independence-and-naive-bayes) concerned bits other than the first. The majoritarian first bit, even if you don't care about it in itself, is a [_simple_ membership test](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/edEXi4SpkXfvaX42j/schelling-categories-and-simple-membership-tests) for the mostly-zeros/mostly-ones category system.
-Unfortunately—_deeply_ unfortunately—this is not a math blog. I _wish_ this were a math blog—that I lived in a world where I could afford to do math blogging for the greater glory of our collective understanding of greater reality. ("Gender?" I would say, confused if not slightly disgusted, "I barely _know_ her.") It would be a better way to live than being condemned to gender blogging in self-defense, hopelessly outgunned, outmanned, outnumbered, outplanned [in a Total Culture War](/2020/Feb/if-in-some-smothering-dreams-you-too-could-pace/) over the future of [my neurotype-demographic](/2021/May/sexual-dimorphism-in-the-sequences-in-relation-to-my-gender-problems/). But since I _do_, somehow, go on living like this—having briefly explained the theory, let's get back to the dreary, how do you say?—_application_.
+Unfortunately—_deeply_ unfortunately—this is not a math blog. I _wish_ this were a math blog—that I lived in a world where I could afford to do math blogging for the greater glory of our collective understanding of greater reality. ("Gender?" I would say, confused if not slightly disgusted, "I barely _know_ her.") It would be a better way to live than being condemned to gender blogging in self-defense, hopelessly outgunned, outmanned, outnumbered, outplanned [in a Total Culture War](/2020/Feb/if-in-some-smothering-dreams-you-too-could-pace/) over [the future of](/2023/Jul/blanchards-dangerous-idea-and-the-plight-of-the-lucid-crossdreamer/) [my neurotype-demographic](/2021/May/sexual-dimorphism-in-the-sequences-in-relation-to-my-gender-problems/). But since I _do_, somehow, go on living like this—having briefly explained the theory, let's get back to the dreary, how do you say?—_application_.
-Defining sex in terms of gamete size or genitals or chromosomes is like the using the never-flipped first bit in our abstract example about the world of length-20 bitstrings. It's not that people _directly_ care about gametes or chromosomes or even gentials in most everyday situations. (You're probably not directly trying to mate with most of the people you meet in everyday situations, and sex chromosomes weren't discovered until the _20th_ century.) It's that that these are _discrete_ features that are [causally](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vhp2sW6iBhNJwqcwP/blood-is-thicker-than-water) entangled with everything _else_ that differs between females and males—including many [correlated](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cu7YY7WdgJBs3DpmJ/the-univariate-fallacy-1) statistical differences of various [effect sizes](/2019/Sep/does-general-intelligence-deflate-standardized-effect-sizes-of-cognitive-sex-differences/), and differences that are harder to articulate or measure, and differences that haven't even been discovered yet (as gametes and chromosomes hadn't respectively been discovered yet in the 16th and 19th centuries) but can be theorized to exist because _sex_ is a very robust abstraction that you need in order to understand the design of evolved biological creatures.
+Defining sex in terms of gamete size or genitals or chromosomes is like the using the never-flipped first bit in our abstract example about the world of length-20 bitstrings. It's not that people _directly_ care about gametes or chromosomes or even gentials in most everyday situations. (You're probably not trying to mate with most of the people you meet in everyday situations, and sex chromosomes weren't discovered until the _20th_ century.) It's that that these are _discrete_ features that are [causally](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vhp2sW6iBhNJwqcwP/blood-is-thicker-than-water) entangled with everything _else_ that differs between females and males—including many [correlated](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cu7YY7WdgJBs3DpmJ/the-univariate-fallacy-1) statistical differences of various [effect sizes](/2019/Sep/does-general-intelligence-deflate-standardized-effect-sizes-of-cognitive-sex-differences/), and differences that are harder to articulate or measure, and differences that haven't even been discovered yet (as gametes and chromosomes hadn't respectively been discovered yet in the 16th and 19th centuries) but can be theorized to exist because _sex_ is a very robust abstraction that you need in order to understand the design of evolved biological creatures.
Discrete features make for better word _definitions_ than high-dimensional statistical regularities, even if most of the everyday inferential utility of _using_ the word comes from the high-dimensional statistical correlates. A dictionary definition is just a helpful pointer to help people pick out "the same" [natural abstraction](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cy3BhHrGinZCp3LXE/testing-the-natural-abstraction-hypothesis-project-intro) in their _own_ world-model.
This is a severe misreading of the sex-realist position. No one wants to _define_ "gender" based on psychology. Mostly, definitions aren't the kind of thing you should have preferences about: you can't coerce reality into changing by choosing different definitions! Rather, there's _already_ a multivariate distribution of bodies and minds in the world, and good definition choices help us coordinate the concepts in different people's heads into a _shared_ map of that territory.
-_One_ of the _many_ distinctions people sometimes want to make when thinking about the multivariate distribution of bodies and minds in the world, is that between the sexes. But sex is by no means the only way in which people differ! In many situations, you might want to categorize or describe people in many different ways, some more or less discrete _versus_ categorical, or high- _versus_ low-dimensional: age or race or religion or subculture or social class or intelligence or agreeableness.
+_One_ of the _many_ distinctions people sometimes want to make when thinking about the multivariate distribution of bodies and minds in the world, is that between the sexes. But sex is by no means the only way in which people differ! In many situations, you might want to categorize or describe people in many different ways, some more or less discrete _versus_ continuous, or high- _versus_ low-dimensional: age or race or religion or subculture or social class or intelligence or agreeableness.
It's possible that the categories that are salient in a particular culture ought to be revised in order to fit the world better: maybe we _should_ talk about categories like "masculine people" (including both typical men, and butch lesbians) more often! But the typical trans advocate shell game of just replacing "sex" with "gender" and letting people choose their "gender" isn't going to fly, because sex actually exists and we have a need for language to talk about it—or maybe, the fact that we have a need for language to talk about it (the fact that the information we observe admits compression) is what it means for sex to "actually" "exist".
-If trans advocates go astray in trying to destroy the concept of sex, their gender-critical foes often
-
- * trans advocates say: there are exceptions, therefore
-
-The typical gender-critical critique of trans ideology
-
-
-
-gamete size or genitals or chromosomes someone has,
-
+One of the standard gender-critical complaints about trans ideology is that it's sexist on account of basing its categories on regressive sex stereotypes. On the categories-as-compression view, we can see that this complaint has something to it: if you remove the discrete, hard-line differences like genitals and chromosomes from your definitions of _female_ and _male_, there's nothing _left_ for the words to attach to but mere statistical regularities—that is, stereotypes.
+Another classic gender-critical trope is that sex just is about
------
Maybe play up the symmetry—
A thing that trans activists get wrong: "lesbians aren't women" reductio
-
-
A thing that gender-criticals get wrong: yes, "stereotypes" are part of the concept; it couldn't actually be otherwise
(Let's [not play dumb about the significance of intersex conditions](https://colinwright.substack.com/p/sex-chromosome-variants-are-not-their) today.)
>
> —_Centaurworld_
-I moved apartments last week, on some philosopher's birthday or the anniversary of a national tragedy, to a studio back on the correct side of the Caldecott Tunnel ([now that I've learned my lesson about](/2023/Jul/blanchards-dangerous-idea-and-the-plight-of-the-lucid-crossdreamer/#correct-side-of-the-tunnel) which side of the tunnel is correct).
+I moved apartments the other week, on some philosopher's birthday or the anniversary of a national tragedy, to a studio back on the correct side of the Caldecott Tunnel ([now that I've learned my lesson about](/2023/Jul/blanchards-dangerous-idea-and-the-plight-of-the-lucid-crossdreamer/#correct-side-of-the-tunnel) which side of the tunnel is correct).
+[TODO: I had thought I had to leave Berkeley, but that was a metonym
+
+my reasonably comfortable afterlife /2022/Jun/an-egoist-faith/
+
+]
Here in the part of Berkeley that's secretly Oakland, there used to be a "free store" on the corner—shelves for people to leave unwanted consumer goods and to take them to a good home. It's gone now, due to some combination of adverse attention from city municipal code inspectors and a fire, which means I need to find some other place to dump my spare junk in the next week and a half.
_ Tail vs. Bailey / Davis vs. Yudkowsky analogy (new block somewhere)
_ mention that "Not Man for the Categories" keeps getting cited
-Notes from pt. 3–6 readthrough (post publication of pt. 1–2)—
+Notes from pt. 3 readthrough—
_ fullname Taylor and Hoffman at start of pt. 3
_ footnote clarifying that "Riley" and Sarah weren't core members of the group, despite being included on some emails?
_ be more specific about Ben's anti-EA and Jessica's anti-MIRI things, perhaps in footnotes
_ try to clarify Abram's categories view (Michael didn't get it)
_ cut lots of words from December 2019 blogging spree
_ in a footnote, defend the "cutting my dick off" rhetorical flourish
+
+Notes from pt. 4 readthrough—
_ mention Nick Bostrom email scandal (and his not appearing on the one-sentence CAIS statement)
_ revise and cut words from "bad faith" section since can link to "Assume Bad Faith"
_ cut words from January 2020 Twitter exchange (after war criminal defenses)
09/16/2023,113516,0\r
09/17/2023,113516,0\r
09/18/2023,115172,1656\r
-09/19/2023,,
\ No newline at end of file
+09/19/2023,116592,1420\r
+09/20/2023,116647,55\r
+09/21/2023,,
\ No newline at end of file
-_ Start Over
-
+- Start Over
- Fake Deeply
+- Beyond the Binary
_ Reply to Scott Alexander on Autogenderphilia
_ Hrunkner Unnerby and the Shallowness of Progress
Minor—
_ horror of gender
+_ math of "sex diffs can still exist in a subspace that is masc/fem compared to genpop"
_ subspace
_ newer Haskell surveys?
_ Book Review: Imogen Binnie's Nevada
_ Book Review: Charles Murray's Facing Reality (short version)
-_ Beyond the Binary
_ Happy Meal
_ Elision _vs_. Choice
_ Multi-Product Review: AI for AGP
projects / Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git / commitdiff