From: M. Taylor Saotome-Westlake Date: Sat, 23 Jul 2022 19:55:53 +0000 (-0700) Subject: long confrontation 7 X-Git-Url: http://534655.efjtl6rk.asia/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=06330dc2c1e5032ddca5fb41d064c807ee7e42c7;p=Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git long confrontation 7 The next scratcher box is "PGBANK" (piggy bank). --- diff --git a/notes/a-hill-twitter-reply.md b/notes/a-hill-twitter-reply.md index 8990d83..f0bc21c 100644 --- a/notes/a-hill-twitter-reply.md +++ b/notes/a-hill-twitter-reply.md @@ -82,30 +82,38 @@ Sure, _in the limit of arbitrarily advanced technology_, everyone could be exact The _reason_ for having sex-segregated sports leagues is because the sport-relevant multivariate trait distributions of female bodies and male bodies are quite different. If you just had one integrated league, females wouldn't be competitive (in most sports, with some exceptions [like ultra-distance swimming](https://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/why-women-have-beaten-men-in-marathon-swimming/)). +It's not that females and males are exactly the same except males are 10% stronger on average (in which case, you might just shrug and accept unequal outcomes, the way we shrug and accept it that some competitors have better genes). Different traits have different relevance to different sports: women do better in ultraswimming _because_ that competition is sampling a corner of sportspace where body fat is an advantage. It really is an apples-to-oranges comparison, rather than "two populations of apples with different mean weight". -It's not that females and males are exactly the same except males are 10% stronger on average (in which case, you might just shrug and +Given the empirical reality of the different multivariate trait distributions, "Who are the best athletes _among females_" is a natural question for people to be interested in, and want separate sports leagues to determine. Including male people in female sports leagues undermines the point of having a separate female league, and [_empirically_, hormone replacement therapy after puberty](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40279-020-01389-3) [doesn't substantially change the picture here](https://bjsm.bmj.com/content/55/15/865). +(Similarly, when conducting [automobile races](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auto_racing), you want there to be rules enforcing that all competitors have the same type of car for some common-sense-reasonable operationalization of "the same type", because a race between a sports car and a [moped](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moped) would be mostly measuring who has the sports car, rather than who's the better racer.) -Different traits have different relevance to different sports +In light of these _empirical_ observations, Yudkowsky's suggestion that an ignorant comittment to an "Aristotelian binary" is the main reason someone might care about the integrity of women's sports, is revealed as an absurd strawman. This just isn't something any scientifically-literate person would write if they had actually thought about the issue _at all_, as contrasted to having _first_ decided (consciously or not) to bolster one's reputation among progressives by dunking on transphobes on Twitter, and wielding one's philosophy knowledge in the service of that political goal. The relevant empirical facts are _not subtle_, even if most people don't have the fancy vocabulary to talk about them in terms of "multivariate trait distributions". + +Yudkowsky's claim to merely have been standing up for the distinction between facts and policy questions doesn't seem credible: if you _just_ wanted to point out that the organization of sports leagues is a policy question rather than a fact (as if anyone had doubted this), why would you throw in the "Aristotelian binary" strawman and belittle the matter as "humorous"? There are a lot of issues that I don't _personally_ care much about, but I don't see anything funny about the fact that other people _do_ care. + +I spend a few paragraphs picking on the "sports segregated around an Aristotelian binary" remark, because sports is a case where the relevant effect sizes are _so_ large as to make the point hard for all but the most ardent gender-identity partisans to deny. + +[TODO sentences about Lia Thomas/Cece Tefler/Andrea Yearwood; feats occured after Yudkowsky's 2018 Tweets, but I claim that this kind of thing was easily predictable to anyone familiar with sex differences] + +But the point is general. + +If any concrete negative consequence of gender self-identity categories is going to be waved away with "Oh, that's a mere _policy_ decision that can be dealt with on some basis other than gender, and therefore doesn't count as an objection to the new definition of gender words", + + +The categories we use for policy decisions are very closely related to the categories we use -women do better in ultraswimming—that competition is sampling a corner of sportspace where body fat is an advantage. It really is an apples-to-oranges comparison, rather than "two populations of apples with different mean weight". -Given the empirical reality of the different multivariate trait distributions, "Who are the best athletes _among females_" is a natural question for people to be interested in, and want separate sports leagues to determine. Including male people in female sports leagues undermines the point of having a separate female league. -(Similarly, when conducting [automobile races](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auto_racing), you want there to be rules enforcing that all competitors have the same type of car for some common-sense-reasonable operationalization of "the same type", because a race between a sports car and a [moped](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moped) would be mostly measuring who has the sports car, rather than who's the better racer.) -In light of these _empirical_ observations, Yudkowsky's suggestion that an ignorant comittment to an "Aristotelian binary" is the main reason someone might care about the integrity of women's sports, is revealed as an absurd strawman. This just isn't something any scientifically-literate person would write if they had actually thought about the issue _at all_, as contrasted to having _first_ decided (consciously or not) to bolster one's reputation among progressives by dunking on transphobes on Twitter, and wielding one's philosophy knowledge in the service of that political goal. The relevant empirical facts are _not subtle_, even if most people don't have the fancy vocabulary to talk about them in terms of "multivariate trait distributions". -Yudkowsky's claim to merely have been standing up for the distinction between facts and policy questions doesn't seem credible: if you _just_ wanted to point out that the organization of sports leagues is a policy question rather than a fact (as if anyone had doubted this), why would you throw in the "Aristotelian binary" strawman and belittle the matter as "humorous"? There are a lot of issues that I don't _personally_ care much about, but I don't see anything funny about the fact that other people _do_ care. -(And in this case, the empirical facts are _so_ lopsided, that if we must find humor in the matter, it really goes the other way. Lia Thomas trounces the entire field by _4.2 standard deviations_ (!!), and Eliezer Yudkowsky feels obligated to _pretend not to see the problem?_ You've got to admit, that's a _little_ bit funny.) -"And *therefore*, people who object to my preferred use of language are ontologically confused!" is *ignoring the interesting part of the problem*. Gender identity's [claim to be non-disprovable](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fAuWLS7RKWD2npBFR/religion-s-claim-to-be-non-disprovable) mostly functions as a way to [avoid the belief's real weak points](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dHQkDNMhj692ayx78/avoiding-your-belief-s-real-weak-points). @@ -167,6 +175,8 @@ Rather, previously sexspace had two main clusters (normal females and males) plu +(And in this case, the empirical facts are _so_ lopsided, that if we must find humor in the matter, it really goes the other way. Lia Thomas trounces the entire field by _4.2 standard deviations_ (!!), and Eliezer Yudkowsky feels obligated to _pretend not to see the problem?_ You've got to admit, that's a _little_ bit funny.) + https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cu7YY7WdgJBs3DpmJ/the-univariate-fallacy https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vhp2sW6iBhNJwqcwP/blood-is-thicker-than-water @@ -176,11 +186,13 @@ https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vhp2sW6iBhNJwqcwP/blood-is-thicker-than-water [TODO: sentences about studies showing that HRT doesn't erase male advantage https://twitter.com/FondOfBeetles/status/1368176581965930501 -https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40279-020-01389-3 -https://bjsm.bmj.com/content/55/15/865 + + + + ] -[TODO sentences about Lia Thomas and Cece Tefler https://twitter.com/FondOfBeetles/status/1466044767561830405 (Thomas and Tefler's feats occured after Yudkowsky's 2018 Tweets, but this kind of thing was easily predictable to anyone familiar with sex differences—cite South Park) +[TODO sentences about Lia Thomas and Cece Tefler] https://twitter.com/FondOfBeetles/status/1466044767561830405 (Thomas and Tefler's —cite South Park) https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10445679/Lia-Thomas-UPenn-teammate-says-trans-swimmer-doesnt-cover-genitals-locker-room.html https://twitter.com/sharrond62/status/1495802345380356103 Lia Thomas event coverage https://www.realityslaststand.com/p/weekly-recap-lia-thomas-birth-certificates Zippy inv. cluster graph! @@ -208,15 +220,16 @@ Because of my hero worship, "he's being intellectually dishonest in response to +Similarly with categories in general, and sex (or "gender") categorization in particular. It's true that the same word can be used in many ways depending on context. But you're _not done_ dissolving the question just by making that observation. +An illustrative example: like many gender-dysphoric males, I cosplay female characters at conventions sometimes. And, unfortunately, like many gender-dysphoric males, I'm _not very good at it_. I think someone looking at my cosplay photos and trying to describe their content in clear language—not trying to be nice to anyone or make a point, but just trying to use language as a map that reflects the territory—would say something like, "This is a photo of a man and he's wearing a dress." The word *man* in that sentence is expressing *cognitive work*: it's a summary of the [lawful cause-and-effect evidential entanglement](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6s3xABaXKPdFwA3FS/what-is-evidence) whereby the photons reflecting off the photograph are correlated with photons reflecting off my body at the time the photo was taken, which are correlated with my externally-observable secondary sex characteristics (facial structure, beard shadow, *&c.*), from which evidence an agent using an [efficient naïve-Bayes-like model](http://lesswrong.com/lw/o8/conditional_independence_and_naive_bayes/) can assign me to its "man" category and thereby make probabilistic predictions about some of my traits that aren't directly observable from the photo, and achieve a better [score on those predictions](http://yudkowsky.net/rational/technical/) than if the agent had assigned me to its "woman" category, where by "traits" I mean not *just* chromosomes ([as you suggested on Twitter](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067291243728650243)), but the *conjunction* of chromosomes *and* reproductive organs _and_ muscle mass (sex difference effect size of [Cohen's *d*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effect_size#Cohen's_d)≈2.6) *and* Big Five Agreeableness (*d*≈0.5) *and* Big Five Neuroticism (*d*≈0.4) *and* short-term memory (*d*≈0.2, favoring women) *and* white-to-gray-matter ratios in the brain *and* probable socialization history *and* [lots of other things](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_differences_in_human_physiology)—including differences we might not necessarily currently know about, but have prior reasons to suspect exist: no one _knew_ about sex chromosomes before 1905, but given all the other systematic differences between women and men, it would have been a reasonable guess (that turned out to be correct!) to suspect the existence of some sort of molecular mechanism of sex determination. -Similarly with categories in general, and sex (or "gender") categorization in particular. It's true that the same word can be used in many ways depending on context. But you're _not done_ dissolving the question just by making that observation. And the one who triumphantly shouts in the public square, +And the one who triumphantly shouts in the public square, "And *therefore*, people who object to my preferred use of language are ontologically confused!" is _ignoring the interesting part of the problem_. Gender identity's [claim to be non-disprovable](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fAuWLS7RKWD2npBFR/religion-s-claim-to-be-non-disprovable) mostly functions as a way to [avoid the belief's real weak points](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dHQkDNMhj692ayx78/avoiding-your-belief-s-real-weak-points). -An illustrative example: like many gender-dysphoric males, I cosplay female characters at conventions sometimes. And, unfortunately, like many gender-dysphoric males, I'm *not very good at it*. I think someone looking at [my cosplay photos](https://www.facebook.com/zmdavis/media_set?set=a.10155131901020199&type=3) and trying to describe their content in clear language—not trying to be nice to anyone or make a point, but just trying to use language as a map that reflects the territory—would say something like, "This is a photo of a man and he's wearing a dress." The word *man* in that sentence is expressing *cognitive work*: it's a summary of the [lawful cause-and-effect evidential entanglement](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6s3xABaXKPdFwA3FS/what-is-evidence) whereby the photons reflecting off the photograph are correlated with photons reflecting off my body at the time the photo was taken, which are correlated with my externally-observable secondary sex characteristics (facial structure, beard shadow, *&c.*), from which evidence an agent using an [efficient naïve-Bayes-like model](http://lesswrong.com/lw/o8/conditional_independence_and_naive_bayes/) can assign me to its "man" category and thereby make probabilistic predictions about some of my traits that aren't directly observable from the photo, and achieve a better [score on those predictions](http://yudkowsky.net/rational/technical/) than if the agent had assigned me to its "woman" category, where by "traits" I mean not *just* chromosomes ([as you suggested on Twitter](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067291243728650243)), but the *conjunction* of chromosomes *and* reproductive organs _and_ muscle mass (sex difference effect size of [Cohen's *d*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effect_size#Cohen's_d)≈2.6) *and* Big Five Agreeableness (*d*≈0.5) *and* Big Five Neuroticism (*d*≈0.4) *and* short-term memory (*d*≈0.2, favoring women) *and* white-to-gray-matter ratios in the brain *and* probable socialization history *and* [lots of other things](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_differences_in_human_physiology)—including differences we might not necessarily currently know about, but have prior reasons to suspect exist: no one _knew_ about sex chromosomes before 1905, but given all the other systematic differences between women and men, it would have been a reasonable guess (that turned out to be correct!) to suspect the existence of some sort of molecular mechanism of sex determination. Making someone say "trans woman" instead of "man" in that sentence depending on my verbally self-reported self-identity may not be forcing them to *lie*. But it *is* forcing them to obfuscate the probabilistic inference they were trying to communicate with the original sentence (about modeling the person in the photograph as being sampled from the "men" [cluster in configuration space](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WBw8dDkAWohFjWQSk/the-cluster-structure-of-thingspace)), and instead use language that suggests a different cluster-structure ("trans women", two words, are presumably a subcluster within the "women" cluster). This encoding might not confuse a well-designed AI into making any bad predictions, but [as you explained very clearly, it probably will confuse humans](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/veN86cBhoe7mBxXLk/categorizing-has-consequences):