From: M. Taylor Saotome-Westlake Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 05:09:23 +0000 (-0700) Subject: drafting "Reply to The Unit" X-Git-Url: http://534655.efjtl6rk.asia/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=1e908d89d3ee7e295bcae93a97833f576df6d011;p=Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git drafting "Reply to The Unit" --- diff --git a/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md b/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md index 5ff9d7a..b713c90 100644 --- a/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md +++ b/content/drafts/reply-to-the-unit-of-caring-on-adult-human-females.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ Category: commentary Tags: epistemology, sex differences, The Unit of Caring, transhumanism Status: draft +> Thou shalt not strike terms from others' expressive vocabulary without suitable replacement. +> +> —[Alicorn](https://twitter.com/luminousalicorn/status/839542071547441152) + _(Attention conservation notice: perhaps not that much new content relative to length if you've already read ["The Categories Were Made for Man to Make Predictions"](http://unremediatedgender.space/2018/Feb/the-categories-were-made-for-man-to-make-predictions/).)_ The author of the (highly recommended!) Tumblr blog [_The Unit of Caring_](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com) [responds to](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com/post/171986501376/your-post-on-definition-of-gender-and-woman-and) an anonymous correspondent's observation that trans-exclusionary radical feminists tend to define the word _woman_ as "adult human biological female": @@ -28,13 +32,13 @@ One might counterargue that this is unjustifiably assuming "biologically female" I've addressed this class of argument at length (about 7500 words) in a previous post, ["The Categories Were Made for Man to Make Predictions"](http://unremediatedgender.space/2018/Feb/the-categories-were-made-for-man-to-make-predictions/), but to summarize _briefly_, while I _agree_ that categories can be defined in many ways to suit different cultural priorities, it's also the case that not all possible categories are equally useful, because the cognitive function of categories is to group similar things together so that we can make similar predictions about them, and not every possible grouping of entities yields a "tight" distribution of predictions that can be usefully abstracted over. -A free-thinking biologist certainly _could_ choose to reject the othrodoxy of grouping living things by ancestry and reproductive isolation and instead choose to study living things that are yellow, but their treatises would probably be difficult to follow, because "living things that are yellow" is instrinsically a much less cohesive subject matter than, say, "birds": experience with black crows is probably going to be _more_ useful when studying yellow canaries than experience with yellow daffodills—even if, in all philosophical strictness, there are a million things that these categories could have been drawn around, and who can say but that some other culture might have chosen color rather than ancestry as the true determinant of "species"? +A free-thinking biologist certainly _could_ choose to reject the othrodoxy of grouping living things by ancestry and reproductive isolation and instead choose to study living things that are yellow, but their treatises would probably be difficult to follow, because "living things that are yellow" is instrinsically a much less cohesive subject matter than, say, "birds": experience with black crows is probably going to be _more_ useful when studying yellow canaries than experience with yellow daffodills—even if, _in all philosophical strictness_, there are a million things that these categories could have been drawn around, and who can say but that some other culture might have chosen color rather than ancestry as the true determinant of "species"? It is of course true that different cultures will place different emphases and interpretations on various ways in which people can differ: being prepubescent or being a parent might have special significance in some cultures that outsiders could never understand. But to say that prepubescents might as well be a "gender"—well, at this point I must confess that I'm really not sure what this "gender" thing is the author is trying to talk about. -And I guess that's the problem. People who assume the "TERFy" definition of _woman_—like, say, the authors of the Mirriam–Webster dictionary [("noun, **1.a.**, an adult female person")](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/woman)—generally aren't trying to invalidate anyone's "gender"; they're trying to talk about _biological sex_ using simple, universally-understood words. Biological sex is obviously not the only category in the world—in a lot of situations, you might care more about whether someone has living children—or for that matter, whether an organism is yellow—than what sex it is. +And I guess that's the problem. People who assume a TERFy definition of _woman_—like, say, the authors of the Mirriam–Webster dictionary [("noun, **1.a.**, an adult female person")](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/woman)—generally aren't trying to invalidate anyone's "gender"; they're trying to talk about _biological sex_ using simple, universally-understood words. Biological sex is obviously not the only category in the world—in a lot of situations, you might care more about whether someone has living children—or for that matter, whether an organism is yellow—than what sex it is. -But when people _do_ want to talk about sex—when they want to carve reality along that _particular_ joint, without denying that there are [superexponentially](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/82eMd5KLiJ5Z6rTrr/superexponential-conceptspace-and-simple-words) many others in the vastness of configuration space—there's something _profoundly frustrating_ about Blue Tribe culture's axiomatic insistence that certain inferences _must not_ be made, that certain conceptual distinctions must not be _expressible_, except perhaps cloaked behind polysyllabic obfuscations like "assigned sex at birth" (as if the doctors made a _mistake_!). +But when people _do_ want to talk about sex—when they want to carve reality along that _particular_ joint, without denying that there are [superexponentially](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/82eMd5KLiJ5Z6rTrr/superexponential-conceptspace-and-simple-words) many others in the vastness of configuration space—there's something _profoundly frustrating_ about [Blue Tribe](http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/30/i-can-tolerate-anything-except-the-outgroup/) culture's axiomatic insistence that certain inferences _must not_ be made, that certain conceptual distinctions must not be _expressible_, except perhaps cloaked behind polysyllabic obfuscations like "assigned sex at birth" (as if the doctors made a _mistake_!). Even if many usages of words like _woman_ can and should be interpreted in a trans-inclusive sense, it's important that it also be possible to sometimes use the words in a trans-exclusive sense in those cases where the distributions of trans people and cis people of a given "gender" differ significantly for the variables of interest. The point is not to be mean to trans women (who are a huge fraction of my and _The Unit of Caring_ author's friends); the point is that it should be socially acceptable to _describe reality using words_. @@ -88,32 +92,37 @@ Consider these fictional (but, I fear, distressingly realistic) dialogues—

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-If it's socially unacceptable for people who want to talk about sex to say "That's not what I meant by _woman_ in this context _and you know it_", then people who would prefer not to acknowledge sex will always get the last word. +The point being illustrated here is that if it's socially unacceptable for people who want to talk about sex to say "That's not what I meant by _woman_ in this context _and you know it_", then people who would prefer not to acknowledge sex will always get the last word—not because they have superior arguments, but because the terms of discourse have been [systematically engineered to conflate dissent with unkindness](/2018/Jan/dont-negotiate-with-terrorist-memeplexes/). + +To this it might be objected that trans activists are merely advocating for greater precision, rather than trying to make it socially unacceptable to think about biological sex: after all, you can just say "cis women" (which excludes trans women, trans men, and natal-female nonbinary people) or "assigned female at birth" (which excludes trans women, but includes trans men and natal-female nonbinary people and presumably [David Reimer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Reimer)) or "uterus-havers" (which excludes trans women and natal females who have had a hystorectomy) if that's what you _really mean_. I think this is underestimating the usefulness of having simple, [_short_](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/soQX8yXLbKy7cFvy8/entropy-and-short-codes) descriptions for the categories that do the most predictive work on typical cases. + +Kind or not, morally justified or not, voluntary or not, sexual dimorphism is _actually a real thing_. Studying the pages of _Gray's Anatomy_—[or _Wikipedia_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_differences_in_human_physiology) if you're on a budget—you can absorb all sorts of detailed, _specific_ knowledge of the differences between female and male humans, from the obvious (sex organs, vocal pitch, height, muscle mass, body hair) to the less-obvious-but-well-known (chromosomes, hormones, pelvis shape) to the comparatively obscure (blood pressure! lymphocyte concentrations! gray-matter-to-white-matter ratios in the brain!). Nor is this surprising from a theoretical standpoint, where we have theories explaining [mechanisms by which](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_selection) sexual dimorphism can evolve and [what kinds of differences](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Parental_investment&oldid=832276512#Trivers'_parental_investment_theory) it produces in different species. + +If—like me—you're the kind of person who is not necessarily _happy_ about sexual dimorphism, you can always deliberately define your categories in order to minimize it: if there's a large sex difference in some observable measurement, just say you _don't care_ about predicting that particular measurement. But people who have _other_ concerns than "minimizing Blue Tribe people's quasi-religious discomfort with sexual dimorphism" (it's my former quasi-religion, too, so I'm allowed to make fun of us) might want a common word—or even just a particular _sense_ of a common word—to describe the world they see, in which sex is a real thing worth noticing. Being limited to just saying "uterus-havers" when the topic of conversation happens to be childbearing (or whatever the approved socially-just constructions turns out to be) is not a suitable replacement (per Alicorn's maxim) when the speaker wants to refer to all the other aspects in which women statistically have things in common, including things that are hard to articulate or measure, and things that may not even be currently _known_. (_I_ certainly don't know what differences in gray-to-white brain matter ratios _mean_, but the map is not the territory: my _ignorance_ -To this it might be objected that trans activists are merely advocating for greater precision, rather than trying to make it socially unacceptable to think about biological sex: after all, you can just say "cis women" (which excludes trans women, trans men, and natal-female nonbinary people) or "assigned female at birth" (which excludes trans women, but includes trans men and natal-female nonbinary people and presumably [David Reimer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Reimer)) or "uterus-havers" (which excludes trans women and natal females who have had a hystorectomy) if that's what you _really mean_. -And it's true; [you _can_](/2016/Nov/editorial-process/). But I think this is underestimating the usefulness of having simple, [_short_](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/soQX8yXLbKy7cFvy8/entropy-and-short-codes) descriptions for the categories that do the most predictive work on typical cases. -Kind or not, morally justified or not, voluntary or not, sexual dimorphism is _actually a real thing_. Studying the pages of _Gray's Anatomy_—or [_Wikipedia_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_differences_in_human_physiology) if you're on a budget—you can absorb all sorts of detailed, _specific_ knowledge of the differences between female and male humans, from the obvious (sex organs, vocal pitch, height, muscle mass, body hair) to the less-obvious-but-well-known (chromosomes, hormones, pelvis shape) to the comparatively obscure (blood pressure! lymphocyte concentrations! gray-matter-to-white-matter ratios in the brain!). -If—[like me](/2017/Dec/theres-a-land-that-i-see-or-the-spirit-of-intervention/)—you're the kind of person who is not necessarily _happy_ about sexual dimorphism, you can always deliberately define your categories in order to minimize it: if there's a large sex difference in some observable measurement, just say you _don't care_ about predicting that particular measurement. +The author goes on to her second objection— -And as long as you're _already_ optimizing your _categories_ for the purpose of assuaging your fear of sexual dimorphism (which is not identical to the purpose of maximizing predictive accuracy and must therefore trade off against it in at least some possible worlds), why not optimize your _hypotheses_ along the same criterion? If there _is_ a large sex difference along some dimension that you have to admit that you care about, you can just say it's due to socialization! Science is difficult enough that no one will ever be able to _prove_ you wrong. +> 2) Someday people are just going to be able to generate the exact physical body they want to inhabit. At that point, "biological" anything isn’t going to apply. -But if you are furthermore an aspiring rationalist with [something to protect](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/SGR4GxFK7KmW7ckCB/something-to-protect)—if you perceive a duty to see the world as it really is, even when it hurts—_especially_ when it hurts— +I definitely agree that biological anything isn't going to apply in the glorious posthuman future of unimaginable power and freedom when people can reshape their body and mind at will. -[uturus-havers isn't sufficient bc natural categories] +[(If we survive.)](https://nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html) -[quote the transhumanism objection] +But it's also not clear how much relevance this science-fictional scenario has to people in the unglorious pre-posthuman present. Yes, we do have HRT and SRS, and these are magnificent acheivements for the grand cause of morphological freedom, and should be available on an informed-consent basis. It's definitely something. -[I used to do this, too] +But it's also definitely not-everything. To get a sense of how far we have to go, I strongly recommend [Eliezer Yudkowsky's heartbreaking 2009 take on what an actually effective male-to-female sex change would take](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QZs4vkC7cbyjL9XA9/changing-emotions). -Imagine if we applied the same tactics to _other_ standard transhumanist goals— +[TODO: I used to be more optimistic] + +It's worth considering that when it comes to _other_ standard transhumanist goals, we typically _don't_ take the possibility of technology opening up desireable new modes of existence as thereby implying that the goals can be achieved today by means of clever redefinitions of words—

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-

Alice: Ever since I lost my mother, I knew I could not rest until Death itself was defeated!

+

Alice: Ever since I lost my mother, I knew I could not rest until Death itself is defeated!

Bob: But as long as you remember her, your mother lives on in you!

@@ -126,6 +135,11 @@ Imagine if we applied the same tactics to _other_ standard transhumanist goals

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-[...] +The _Unit of Caring_ author continues: + +> If your definition of a 'woman' is one where trans people will be their preferred gender once the tech catches up, then I think you should probably reflect on what actually changes about anyone's lived experience on that magic day when our cyborgs hit your threshold. And if it isn't, then you're stuck asserting that if a woman is cell-for-cell identical to me then she still might not be a 'biological woman'. That's a sign that this isn't actually about biology. + +I would rather say that's a sign that we're facing an instance of the [Sorities paradox](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/), the ancient challenge to applying discrete categories to a continuous world. If one grain of sand doesn't make a heap (the argument goes), and the addition of one more grain of sand can't change whether something is a heap, then we can conclude from [the principle of mathematical induction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction) that no number _n_ ∈ ℕ of grains make a heap. (Or, alternatively, that the absence of any sand constitutes a ["heap of zero grains"](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/nso8WXdjHLLHkJKhr/the-conscious-sorites-paradox).) + +While the Sorities paradox is certainly an instructive philosophical exercise, its practical impact seems limited: most people find it more palatable to conclude that that the heap-ness is a somewhat fuzzy concept, rather than that the argument isn't _really_ about the amount of sand in a location. -_Nature to be commanded must be obeyed_.